













not	 only	 give	 the	 NSW	 Police	 Force	more	 powers,	 but	 also	 reflect	 the	 significant	 role	 of	
institutional	 police	 power	 and	 the	 pre‐emptive	 logic	 of	 criminal	 law.	 We	 examine:	 the	
introduction	of	 serious	 crime	prevention	 orders;	 the	 introduction	of	 public	 safety	 orders;	
investigative	detention	powers	in	relation	to	terrorist	acts;	and	confiscation,	forfeiture	and	


































reach	 of	 criminal	 law	 to	 govern	 apparent	 threats	 to	 social	 order.	We	 examine:	 serious	 crime	
prevention	orders,	introduced	by	the	Crimes	(Serious	Crime	Prevention	Orders)	Act	2016	(NSW);	
public	 safety	orders,	 introduced	by	 the	Criminal	Legislation	Amendment	 (Organised	Crime	and	
Public	Safety)	Act	2016	 (NSW);	 investigative	detention	of	 terrorist	suspects,	 introduced	by	the	
Terrorism	 (Police	 Powers)	 Amendment	 (Investigative	 Detention)	 Act	 2016	 (NSW);	 and	 new	
confiscation,	forfeiture	and	search	powers,	and	trespass	offences	that	target	protests,	introduced	













of	 these	 laws	 that	 shape	 the	police	power	as	one	operative	 logic	of	 the	criminal	 law,	and	one	
source	of	its	authority.	We	suggest	that	the	blurring	of	categories	of	public	order/organised	crime	
and	 suspect/convicted	 offender	 that	 is	 evident	 across	 the	 new	 legislation	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	
criminal	 law’s	 power	 to	 police.	 In	 understanding	 these	 combined	 laws	 as	 police	 power,	 we	
analyse	protest	together	with	‘serious	crime’,	and	‘ordinary	suspects’	with	terrorists.	This	method	




This	article	begins	by	setting	out	our	understanding	of	 the	criminal	 law	as	 the	exercise	of	 the	
state’s	police	power	as	an	expansive,	pre‐emptive	governance	also	grounded	in	the	legitimacy	of	
legality	and	due	process.	The	next	section	outlines	some	political	context	 in	which	 these	 laws	
were	passed	to	draw	attention	to	the	earlier	amplifications	of	police	power	that	preceded	them,	
before	overviewing	the	rationale	for	each	law.	We	then	thematically	address	the	combined	effects	









been	 marginalised	 or	 ‘residual’	 in	 the	 study	 of	 criminal	 law	 (Dubber	 2006;	 Farmer	 2006;	










administrative	 and	 judicial	 power	 respectively	 (Neocleous	 2000).	 Critical	 analyses	 of	 the	 law	
making	 power	 (McBarnett	 1981)	 or	 the	 ‘quasi‐judicial’	 (Neocleous	 2000:	 105)	 or	 sovereign	
power	of	policing	(Hardt	and	Negri	2000)	have	provided	important	correctives	to	one	half	of	this	











NSW	Police	 Force	 to	 act	 on	behalf	 of	 the	 state,	 including	powers	 under	 the	Law	Enforcement	
(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	(LEPRA	2002)	(NSW),	policies	and	regulatory	frameworks	









harms	to	persons	(Dubber	2006:	134).	Dubber	(2006:	118)	maintains	that	 ‘criminal	 law	in	 its	




in	 the	 power	 to	 police’	 (Dubber	 2006:	 108).	 These	 key	 features	 include:	 the	 creation	 of	
‘offenderless	offences’	where	implicit	status	offences	replace	traditional	conduct	and	mens	rea	
offences,	 and	where	 the	only	victim	 is	 the	state;	 a	 focus	on	 incapacitation	as	 the	 rationale	 for	
criminal	 laws	 intervention;	 and	 a	 reliance	 on	 inchoate	 offences	 like	 attempt,	 conspiracy,	
facilitation.	 These	 features	 of	 the	 police	 power	 enable	 criminal	 law	 to	 act	 upon	 a	 person’s	
‘criminal	 character’	 rather	 than	 any	 behaviour	 resembling	 the	 elements	 of	 a	 criminal	 offence	
(Dubber	2006:	128‐136).	
	
In	a	related	 inquiry,	Farmer’s	 (2006:	147)	 thesis	 is	 that	modern	 jurisprudence	should	 include	
police	power	because	much	of	the	English	state’s	power	to	police	was	juridified	as	the	criminal	
law	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	and	propelled	by	the	birth	of	the	modern	police	force.	As	a	
result,	 prevention	 and	 deterrence	have	been	 significant	 organising	 logics	 in	 the	 criminal	 law,	
which	underpinned	the	exercise	of	 the	criminal	 law	from	that	 time	(Farmer	2006).	Foucault’s	
work	in	charting	the	debates	on	the	origins	of	prevention	in	criminal	law	has	a	corrective	role	in	




The	 criminologists	 wanted	 to	 put	 aside	 legality	 by	 abandoning	 the	 notion	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 in	 favour	 of	 assessing	 the	 level	 of	 risk	 an	 individual	 posed	 to	 society.	 They	
advocated	that	the	criminal	law	was	for	the	‘defence	of	society’	rather	than	as	a	mechanism	of	
punishment	flowing	from	an	individual’s	intent	to	do	harm.	In	this	view,	the	role	of	the	criminal	

























The	 coexistence	 of	 multiple	 sources	 of	 authority	 for	 the	 criminal	 law	 underscores	 tensions	
between	the	criminal	law	deriving	legitimacy	through	prevention	and	efficiency	through	acting	
upon	 future	 threats,	 whilst	 simultaneously	 being	 institutionally	 grounded	 in	 acting	 on	 past	
actions	and	principles	of	legality.	A	large	body	of	literature	on	the	sustained	‘preventive	turn’	of	
the	criminal	law	over	the	last	two	decades	(Ashworth	and	Zedner	2014;	Zedner	2009)	suggests	
an	 incompatibility	 between	 prevention/pre‐emption	 and	 criminal	 law	 principles	 or,	
alternatively,	 that	 the	 justificatory	norms	of	 the	criminal	 law	have	been	eroded.	Whilst	others	
point	 to	how	the	operation	of	 the	criminal	 law	on	risk	and	 future	threats	 is	neither	novel	nor	
exceptional,	our	greater	interest	here	is	with	the	specific	questions	and	tensions	that	might	be	






1998).	 Whilst	 the	 specific	 features	 of	 NSW	 law	 and	 order	 are	 relevant,	 globalised	 forms	 of	
governance	through	crime	control	also	make	this	a	characteristic	of	most	other	Australian	states,	


















punishing	 Indigenous	 peoples	 through	 public	 order	 offences—including	 offensive	 language,	
public	drunkenness	and	then	‘protective	custody’—has	been	well	documented	for	their	structural	
effects	in	disrupting	self‐determination	(Cunneen	2001).	In	these	very	material	senses	of	 ‘pre‐
emption’,	 the	 criminalisation	 of	Aboriginal	 and	Torres	 Strait	 Islander	peoples	 exemplifies	 the	
police	 power	 function	 of	 criminal	 law.	 Moreover,	 the	 indistinction	 between	 police	
powers/criminal	offences	has	been	central	to	the	specific	forms	of	punitive	regulation	enabled	by	
NSW	criminal	justice	processes.	For	example,	proactive	bail	policing	is	a	cause	of	the	increase	in	
the	 Indigenous	remand	population	 in	NSW,	one	of	 the	 fastest	growing	 in	Australia	 (Bureau	of	
Crime	Statistics	and	Research	2016:	17).	
	
The	 revival	 and	 recalibration	 of	 the	 NSW	 consorting	 laws	 through	 the	 Crimes	 Amendment	
(Consorting	 and	 Organised	 Crime)	 Act	 2012	 (NSW)	 further	 exemplified	 the	 inherent	 fusion	
between	 pre‐emption,	 police	 power	 and	 criminal	 law.	 The	 2012	 amendments1	 made	 it	 an	
indictable	offence	to	associate	with	a	convicted	offender	on	two	or	more	occasions,	regardless	of	











effect	 on	numerous	 crime	groups’	(Grant	2016:	78).	However,	 the	NSW	Police	are	using	 their	
consorting	 powers	 to	 target	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 ‘suspect	 populations’.	 In	 its	 2016	 review	 of	 the	
legislation,	the	NSW	Ombudsman	presented	data	that	showed	that	Police	used	consorting	powers	
disproportionately	 against	Aboriginal	peoples	 and	young	people.	The	Ombudsman	 found	also	
that	 Police	 were	 consistently	 wrong	 when	 identifying	 young	 people	 as	 ‘convicted	 offenders’,	
resulting	in	79	per	cent	of	all	consorting	warnings	being	made	in	error	(NSW	Ombudsman	2016:	
4).	The	Ombudsman	further	found	that	NSW	Police	made	a	policy	decision	to	extend	the	scope	of	
the	 provision	 to	 all	 criminal	 offences,	 instead	 of	 limiting	 it	 to	 organised	 crime	 as	 originally	
intended	by	Parliament.	Thus,	consorting	was	used	not	only	by	the	NSW	Police	Gang	Squad	and	










and	 that	 the	 amendments	were	 necessary	 ‘to	mitigate	 the	 unintended	 impacts	 of	 [the	 law’s]	
operation’	(NSW	Ombudsman	2016:	iii).	In	effect,	the	recommendations	did	little	to	de‐legitimise	











There	 are	 significant	 institutional	 drivers	 towards	 this	 expansion	 of	 police	 powers.	 The	




and	 the	 NSW	 Police	 Force	 as	 political	 actors	 shaping	 NSW	 criminal	 law	 (Finnane	 2000)	was	
manifest	in	the	April	2014	amalgamation	of	the	Attorney	General’s	and	Justice	Department	with	
the	 Police	 and	 Emergency	 Services	 portfolio	 into	 a	 single	 ‘Police	 and	 Justice’	 cluster.	 The	
reshuffling	of	the	new	Minister	for	Justice	and	Police	as	senior	to	the	Attorney	General	arguably	





the	Tink	 (2015)	Review	of	Police	Oversight,	which	was	 advocated	 strongly	 by	 the	NSW	Police	
Association	and	aimed	strategically	at	weakening	the	power	of	the	Police	Integrity	Commission	
(Police	Association	of	NSW	2014).	The	review	rejected	options	for	civilian	investigation	of	police	













activity’	 (Grant	2016:	73‐78)	Together	with	PSOs,	 they	were	 framed	as	part	of	 the	NSW	state	
government’s	‘election	commitment	to	introduce	tough	new	powers	to	give	Police	the	upper	hand	
in	the	fight	against	serious	crime’	(Grant	2016:	73‐78).	The	NSW	law	is	adapted	from	the	United	











































‘investigative	 detention’.	 That	 is,	 arrest	 and	 detention	 are	 not	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 charging	
someone	suspected	of	having	committed	a	crime,	but	for	investigation/prevention	of	crimes	that	



























Minister	 for	 Industry,	 Resources	 and	 Energy	 stated	 the	 legislation	 was	 designed	 ‘to	 create	 a	

















reasonable	grounds	 to	suspect	a	person	has	 items	to	be	used	to	 lock	on	to	a	structure	 for	 the	
purpose	of	interfering	with	the	conduct	of	a	business	or	that	will	be	used	in	a	way	that	is	a	serious	
risk	 to	 safety.	 It	 also	undermined	 the	 longstanding	prohibition	 in	LEPRA	2002	 (NSW)	against	
Police	giving	move‐on	directions	to	protestors.	Now	Police	may	give	directions	to	protestors	if	
the	 officer	 believes	 there	 is	 a	 ‘safety	 risk’.	 Police	 are	 additionally	 empowered	 to	 move‐on	
















of	 potential	 serious	 criminality	 that	 blurs	 conventional	 distinctions	 between	 summary	 and	





the	offences	of	 the	Drugs	Misuse	and	Trafficking	Act	1985	 (NSW)	 to	pre‐emption.	As	 a	 result,	
















Lastly,	 a	 person	may	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 SCPO	 if	 ‘involved	 in	 serious	 crime	 related	 activity’.	 This	
includes	facilitating	another	person’s	engagement	in	a	serious	crime,	or	the	likelihood	the	person	
may	 facilitate	 another	 person’s	 engagement.	 The	 subject	 need	 not	 be	 suspected	 by	 Police	 of	
having	 engaged	 in	 serious	 crime.	 As	 with	 the	 consorting	 regime,	 the	 framing	 of	 suspicion	
justifying	police	 intervention	 is	 the	criminal	association	 identified	by	 the	Police.	Criminalising	
facilitation	 legitimises	 the	 policing	 of	 family,	 social	 and	 community	 networks	who	 the	 Police	














are	extended	beyond	 the	notional	 requirement	 that	 criminality	 is	defined	by	 guilt	 of	 criminal	
offending.	However,	the	key	dynamic	for	this	legislation,	which	requires	an	interpretation	that	
goes	beyond	the	erosion	of	procedural	rule	of	law	norms,	is	the	assertion	of	police	power	as	a	
means	 of	 defining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 criminal	 law.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 further	 by	 the	 extended	
investigative	detention	regime.	The	whole	array	of	anti‐terrorism	laws	has	been	justified	through	
discourses	of	necessity	and	risk.	However,	the	steady	replication	of	the	expanded	police	powers	
introduced	 by	 these	 laws	 (for	 example,	 extended	periods	 of	 detention	 and	 control	 orders)	 to	
cover	other	forms	of	association,	such	as	outlaw	motorcycle	gangs	and	serious	criminal	groups,	
belies	 claims	 to	 exceptionalism.	 Rather,	 ‘operational	 necessity’,	 defined	 largely	 according	 to	




include	 children	 for	 whom	 there	 are	 specific	 procedural	 protections	 across	 other	 domains	
(including	criminal)	of	 the	 law,	but	also	removes	 from	the	process	any	judicial	scrutiny	of	 the	
evidence	or	suspicion	used	by	the	Police	to	justify	the	detention.	In	this	way,	the	Police	are	both	
extending	the	scope	of	the	targeted	population	defined	according	to	police	conceptions	of	risk	






are	 fluid	and	vaguely	constructed	across	 the	new	 laws.	For	 the	Police,	 ‘serious	 risks	 to	public	
safety’	are	the	threshold	question	in	relation	to	PSOs;	‘serious	safety	risks’	to	any	person	trigger	
the	 anti‐protest	 laws;	 and	 ‘preventing	 a	 terrorist	 act’	 enables	 investigative	 detention.	 For	 the	












removed	 any	 ambiguities.	 In	 the	 limited	 parliamentary	 debates,	 protecting	 ‘the	 public’	 was	








Police	have	always	been	primary	definers	of	 legitimate	protests,	 routinely	 intervening	against	
presumed	threats	of	violence	and	to	public	order,	including	when	protests	have	been	authorised	
under	 the	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	 (NSW).5	However,	 the	new	 laws	 undermine	 the	 Part	 4	
provisions	 and	make	Police	 ‘the	 arbiters	 of	what	makes	 a	 legitimate	protest’	 (McNamara	 and	
Quilter	 2016)	 by	 empowering	 them	 to	 move‐on	 protestors	 when	 the	 officer	 ‘believes	 on	
reasonable	grounds’	there	is	a	‘serious	risk	to	the	safety’	of	the	person	targeted	‘or	to	any	other	
person’	(s	200	Law	Enforcement	(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	(NSW)).	This	constructs	a	
new	 legal	 standard	 to	 justify	move‐on	directions	against	protestors,	 even	when	 the	protest	 is	
authorised	or	‘apparently	genuine’,	and	formalises	institutional	police	power	into	criminal	law’s	
power	to	police.	Because	‘safety	risks’	are	not	defined	in	this	legislative	scheme,	it	gives	Police	




and	 inconvenience	 and	 even	 ‘aggravation	 and	 a	 risk	 of	 danger’	 are	 not	 grounds	 for	 refusing	















of	engaging	 in	terrorist	acts.	For	the	purposes	of	 investigative	detention,	a	terrorist	suspect	 is	
defined	as	someone	committing,	‘involved	in	preparing	or	planning’,	or	possessing	‘a	thing	that	is	
connected	with	 the	 commission	 of,	 or	 the	 preparation	 or	 planning	 for,	 a	 terrorist	 act’	 (s	 25B	
Terrorism	(Police	Powers)	Act	2002	(NSW)).	As	noted	above,	the	evidentiary	basis	for	detention	
cannot	 be	 tested	 substantially	 before	 a	 court.	 Rather,	 the	 Police	 are	 empowered	 to	 detain	 ‘a	
terrorism	suspect	for	investigation	into	a	past	or	future	terrorist	act	for	the	purposes	of	assisting	















However,	we	 argue	 that	 the	 dichotomy	 of	 distinct	 categories	 of	 judicial/police	 power	 fails	 to	
capture	fully	the	operation	and	effect	of	the	policing	processes	enabled	in	the	criminal	law.	
	
PSOs	provide	a	mechanism	for	Police	 to	determine	the	basis	on	which	 targeted	 individuals	or	
groups	 can	be	present	 in	 a	public	place	 and	 engage	 in	public	 activity	 (McNamara	 and	Quilter	
2016).	 Through	 the	 PSO	 legislation,	 Police	 have	 acquired	 unconstrained,	 primary	 decision‐






other	 criminal	 information	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 order.	An	 appeal	 to	 the	 Supreme	Court	 is	 only	
available	if	the	order	lasts	longer	than	72	hours.	Whilst	the	appeal	is	fashioned	as	a	merits	review,	






out	 punishment	 as	 a	 feature	 of	 every	 day	modern	 policing	 (Neocleous	 2000).	 This	 power	 is	
reflected	by	the	police	capacity	to	identify	and	target	potential	subjects	of	the	order	and	to	shape	
and	control	the	information	that	underpins	the	decision	to	issue	the	order.	This	in	turn	enables	




While	 the	District	Court	 (post‐conviction)	or	Supreme	Court	 (no	conviction)	 issues	a	SCPO,	as	
with	the	PSO,	the	person	subject	to	the	order	is	not	provided	with	the	information	used	by	the	
Police,	DPP	or	Crime	Commission	to	ground	the	order.	The	putative	judicial	functions	required	to	
issue	 the	 SCPO	 rest	 upon	 and	 effectively	 legitimise	 the	 secrecy	 surrounding	 the	 police	
construction	 of	 evidence.	 Restricting	 access	 to	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 the	 need	 for	 the	 SCPO	 is	
asserted	effectively	shields	from	challenge	or	scrutiny	the	initial	police	designation	of	a	person	as	
a	legitimate	target	for	a	SCPO,	the	reasoning	behind	the	designation,	the	methods	used	to	obtain	





The	 transfer	of	 judicial	 to	police	power	and	the	 inter‐relationship	between	 judicial	and	police	
power	 illustrate	how	criminal	 law	is	constituted	 through,	and	draws	upon,	different	modes	of	
authority	 and	 power.	 Through	 these	 supervisory	 orders,	 police	 power	 is	 one,	 increasingly	






process.	 Either	 way,	 the	 constitutive	 function	 of	 police	 power	 is	 the	 important	 dynamic	 to	
criminal	law	revealed	in	the	new	orders.	
	









Being	 given	 legal	 authority	 to	 intervene	 directly	 against	 a	 designated	 risk	 enables	 Police	 to	
ground	criminality	in	a	state	of	being	or	surrounding	circumstance	dissociated	from	the	minimum	
expectations	of	 individual	agency	 inscribed	 in	criminal	 law	through	the	requirement	 for	actus	





yet	 committed	an	offence.	The	broad	definition	of	 the	 ‘terrorism	suspect’	 and	 the	unspecified	
nature	 of	 the	 future	 terrorist	 act	 enable	 arrests	 and	 prolonged	 detention	 as	 core	 operational	




against	 a	 suspect,	 and	 normalises	 the	 use	 of	 arrest	 primarily	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 intelligence	
gathering.	
	
Similarly,	 some	of	 the	new	offences	are	designed	 to	 function	as	police	power	 (Dixon	1997)	 in	
much	 the	 same	 way	 as	 the	 offence	 of	 consorting	 (Steel	 2003).	 For	 example,	 the	 offence	 of	
aggravated	 unlawful	 entry	 threatens	 a	 serious	 sanction	 against	 refusal	 to	move‐on	 or	 vacate	
property	in	protest	situations.	Combined	with	the	extended	move‐on	powers	in	s	200	LEPRA	2002	
(NSW),	 the	 ‘reasonable	 force’	 allowable	when	exercising	 the	 arrest	 power	 against	 individuals	
deemed	by	Police	to	be	 interfering	or	 intending	to	interfere	with	a	business	or	representing	a	
serious	risk	to	personal	safety	inevitably	will	involve	groups	of	heavily	armed	Police	moving	into	




new	 interventionist	 orders.	 Resisting	 the	 exercise	 of	 police	 powers	 is	 already	 criminalised	 in	
other	contexts,	notably	the	refusal	to	comply	with	move‐on	directions	(s	199	LEPRA	2002	(NSW);	
s	 9	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	 (NSW)).	However,	 the	potential	 prohibitions,	 restrictions	 and	
other	 requirements	 that	 can	 be	 imposed	 under	 a	 SCPO	 are	 broadly	 defined	 and	 attach	 to	 a	
potentially	wide	range	of	police	powers	that	make	breaches	relatively	easy	to	enforce.	While	the	
SCPO	is	fundamentally	a	control	order	in	that	it	regulates	a	perceived	risk,	its	monitoring	fits	into	
a	 wider	 web	 of	 police	 surveillance	 practices,	 such	 as	 bail	 compliance	 checking	 and	 Suspect	
Targeting	Management	 Plans	 (Sentas	 and	 Pandolfini	 2017).	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 SCPO	 is	 imposed	
through	civil	proceedings	that	escalate	to	criminal	proceedings	if	the	order	is	breached	indicates	








Most	studies	of	pre‐emption	analyse	 it	 in	 isolation	 from	the	police	power,	which	 is	posited	as	
related	to	but	separate	from	the	criminal	law.	In	this	register,	the	pre‐emptive	turn	reflects	the	
law’s	 colonisation	 by	 expansive	 imperatives	 of	 risk	 prevention.	 However,	 as	 Farmer	 (2014)	









but	 of	 reconstructing	 in	 a	 more	 general	 sense	 how	 the	 criminal	 law	 has	


































3	 The	 provisions	 of	 the	 Act	 relating	 to	 aggravated	 trespass,	 interfering	with	 a	mine,	 commenced	 on	 1	 June	 2016.	
Provisions	relating	to	police	powers	commenced	on	1	November	2016.	










Court	allowing	a	protest	outside	 the	vacant	home	of	 then	Federal	 Immigration	Minister,	Philip	Ruddock,	and	 the	
demonstration	being	peaceful,	police	prevented	demonstrators	gaining	access	 to	 the	street	where	 the	house	was	
located.	Although	the	police	refused	to	give	reasons	for	their	actions	at	the	time,	it	was	later	reported	they	did	so	to	
prevent	a	‘disturbance’.	
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